An Historiographical Approach to Democratization by Baesler, Martin
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
61 
 




Faculty of History, University of Cambridge; Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg; 
Email: martin.baesler@politik.uni-freiburg.de, mkfb2@cam.ac.uk  
 
Abstract: 
Contemporary theoretical examinations of the processes of democratization have a common 
feature. They view the transformation of regimes and the implementation of democracy from 
the perspective of institutionalization. Moreover, they evaluate the success of democratization 
according to minimalistic definitions of democracy. These theories manifest in a disregard for 
the historical dimension of a development in the meaning of democracy, and its relation to local 
and contemporary circumstances. As a consequence, these theories shed little light on the 
origins and vicissitudes of democratization in the different regions of the world. In this paper, I 
argue that the contextualizing historiographic method of the Cambridge School, and in 
particular the work of John Dunn, offer a valuable means to a critical reflection of 
democratization.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the search for an understanding of the processes of democratization, several studies have 
emerged in the last two decades questioning the causes and effects of regime changes towards 
democracy. It is a very common characteristic of these theories that they base their scientific 
schemes on the normative assumption that the implementation of democracy follows a certain 
historical agenda or concept of democracy. Democratic transformation thus appears to be a 
continual process of social development resulting from normatively deduced varieties of 
democratic institutions. Amidst a plurality of approaches dealing with the processes of 
institutionalizing a pre-given understanding of a pro-democratic stance, a critical approach to a 
contextual understanding of the emergence of democracy is rarely considered. One of the main 
representatives of this approach is John Dunn, founder of what is now known as the Cambridge 
School. In his writings, John Dunn leaves room for an understanding of democratization which 
differs principally from other approaches through the scrutinizing examination and deeply 
reflected discussion of democracy. As a result, he offers a multifaceted method of critical 
examination on the paradox that “today, in politics, democracy is the name for what we cannot 
have, yet cannot cease to want”.1 He addresses the idealization of the concept of democracy by 
providing a fundamentally historical perspective. As a result, he draws the conclusion that 
present-day democratization cannot in part be understood without considering the hegemonic 
power of the Western world. He thereby criticizes the commonly shared assumption that 
democracy is to be seen as a universal value in its own right, since this view disregards power-
relations in the light of which its implementation and sustenance is promoted or rather enforced. 
His considerations call to attention that the transitions to democracy are not just a recent 
phenomenon, but instead must necessarily be studied in their present-day predominance as a 
result of their 200 year long legacy. In this analysis, the word democracy has to be clearly 
distinguished from its ideological underpinning, as well as from forms of government that are 
named democratic but make little attempt to promote democratic values. Dunn states “Most 
writers who approach the subject today tend to think of democracy as a definite set of political 
institutions, which rest on a clear and compelling set of principles, and yield reliably 
encouraging practical consequences. None of these presumptions is well founded, and their 
combination is dangerously misleading.”2 In his book Setting the People Free Dunn offers a 
knowledgeable and insightful alternative to the current democratic theories by stressing the 
importance of supplanting the moral imperative of democracy with a primarily political-
historical understanding. 
                                                 
1 J. Dunn, “Democratic Theory”, J. Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 27. 
2 J. Dunn Getting Democracy into Focus, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-opening/focus_2944.jsp, 
19.10. 2005, (20.08.2010). 
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As a result, and in this paper, I will outline the main features of John Dunn’s democratic theory, 
in order to demonstrate the value of his approach to the study and understanding of 
democratization. In the first part, I will present a brief overview of current interpretations of 
democratization. Whereupon, I will deal with John Dunn’s critical reply to the current 
developments in democratic theory. Thereafter, I will outline his method of historiography in 
order to then introduce his critical assumptions of the success of democratization, in contrast to 
and as a reflection on common assertions of democracy. 
2. THE QUEST FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
The theories of the third wave of democratization were driven by an immensely euphoric belief 
in the forthcoming success of democracy on a global scale. Theorists of this period assumed 
democracy the best form of political organization, which would doubtlessly spread its wings 
across the globe. As a theoretical basis for their assumption and comparative analysis of this 
process they referred to the minimalist definitions of democracy, as put forward in the theories 
of Schumpeter, Dahl or Przeworski. These political theorists reduced democracy to “the 
question of free and general electoral competition, vertical accountability and the fact that the 
most powerful political and social actors played the political game according to democratically 
institutionalized rules.”3 This framework of analysis facilitated a fairly generalized comparison 
of the processes of democratization in very different regions of the world. It also somehow 
mirrored the expectations that the process of democratic change is predictable and planable, as 
argued by Di Palma in his work To Craft Democracies.4 The analytical as well as political 
advantage of the concept of electoral democracy soon became a disadvantage when the 
methodic undertone raised its voice seeking a better understanding of the prerequisites of a 
successful and lasting functionality of democracy. Moreover, it hampered the more general 
inquisitiveness concerning the question of whether the transition to a democratic regime was in 
fact an adequate solution towards striving for a free and well-ordered society.  
After the revolutionary changes in the run of 1989 the theories had to deal with variants of 
success as well as with those countries where democratization had failed or shown the barely 
distinguishable visage of a hybrid regime. Due to these developments the focus shifted to the 
dependency between democratization and other concepts, most notably those of nation state, 
rule of law, human rights or that of globalization. The typology of democratic development was 
especially complicated in the face of illiberal democracies.5 Carothers noted that the initial 
euphoria over democratic development had lost much of its scientific appeal: “What is often 
thought of as an uneasy precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright 
dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of the countries in the 
                                                 
3 W. Merkel and A. Croissant, “Good and Defective Democracies”, Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 
2004, pp.199–213, p. 199. 
4 G. Di Palma, To Craft Democracies, Berkeley: University of California Press 1990. 
5 Cf. F. Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997, pp. 22-43. 
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developing world and the post-communist world.”6 His criticism of democratic pragmatism 
contains a demand for a paradigmatic change. Yet in his proposal for that change he does not 
elaborate on the need for reflection about the intellectual origins of the necessity to promote 
democratic practices and institutions. Not to mention the question of what we actually mean 
when we talk about democratic practices. Nevertheless, it became clearer that the historical 
inevitability of democratization had to be put into perspective. Democracy’s cultural triumph 
had to be contextualized, as was prominently elaborated by Huntington in his seminal work The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. In another respect, the close 
interconnection between democracy, the capitalist market system and civil society was put into 
question with regard to the increase in the complexity of economic and political structures on 
the global scene.7  
The Historical Turn 
In light of this skepticism a new theoretical attempt was put forward by Sen who pointed out 
that we must pay greater attention to the roots of democracy in different cultures. In his work 
Democracy and its Global Roots he points out that the concept of democracy has to be 
examined in specific cultural contexts: “There are, in fact, many manifestations of a firm 
commitment to public communication and associative reasoning that can be found in different 
places and times across the world.”8 Sen made clear that the diverse manifestations of public 
reasoning in the background and foreground of every culture could be seen as a prerequisite for 
the dynamic of democratization: “This global heritage is ground enough to question the 
frequently reiterated view that democracy is therefore just a form of Westernization. The 
recognition of this history has direct relevance in contemporary politics in pointing to the 
global legacy of protesting and promoting social deliberation and pluralist interactions, which 
cannot be any less important today than they were in the past when they were championed.”9  
The latest attempts at comparatistic studies concentrate on the historical dimensions and 
domestic effects of the institutionalization of democracy, as demonstrated in the theories of 
Capoccia und Ziblatt. Both authors call attention to the historical turn in democratization 
studies: “The collective ‘return to history’ reflects a growing appreciation among political 
scientists of the conclusions that can be drawn from the history of democratization, and of the 
constraints imposed by history on the prospects of democratization.”10 It is the aim of this 
                                                 
6 T. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 5-
21, p. 18. 
7 Cf. B. Gilley, “Democratic Triumph, Scholarly Pessimism”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2010, 
pp. 160-167. 
8 A. Sen, “Democracy and its Global Roots: Democratization is not the same as Westernization”, The New 
Republic, October 6, 2003, pp. 29-35, p. 34. 
9 Ibid., p. 30. 
10 G. Capoccia and D. Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for 
Europe and Beyond”, Comparative Political Studies, August/September 2010, vol. 43, 8-9: pp. 931-968. p. 932. 
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historical method to unveil the democratic wave approach, which only considered the 
development of democracy episodically. Instead, democratization should in future be studied as 
“the result of intense domestic conflicts along different lines of cleavage, and was shaped by 
transnational impulses, intellectual exchanges, and momentous events that had an impact that 
traveled across national boundaries in a fashion that we often myopically imagine is distinctive 
to our own age.”11 A further attempt to add to a historical reflection on democratization was 
Keane’s book The Life and Death of Democracy. His extensive study strives for a new 
categorization of the state of democratic affairs and culminates in the characterization of the 
contemporary form of democracy as a monitory democracy.12  
John Dunn argues that Keane’s attempt to ascribe the origins of the word, the idea, as well as 
form of government to the concept of monitory democracy does not succeed in offering a 
coherent conceptional basis for the understanding of the political conditions we are facing.13  
3. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO 
DEMOCRACY 
The term democracy is used multifariously. On the one hand, it designates a concept that has 
gained tremendous importance, following Tocqueville’s first coining of it as a way of life that 
most effectively assimilates the social, political and economic landscapes. The term also 
includes the various manners of political participation, of which universal suffrage is the most 
significant. On the other hand, it is closely connected with the understanding of democracy as a 
system of representation that comprises an intricate network of institutions, which according to 
Tilly is based on the attempt to enact a „broad, equal, protected, binding consultation of citizens 
with respect to state actions“ 14 . The institutional setting is to act as a safeguard for legal 
principles, for political and private liberties as well as for political participation and 
competition. Finally, the term is used by all those critics of the social and political conditions 
who refer to a belief in an ideal democracy as a counterargument to the actual form of 
democratic regime which they consider to be a façade for all sorts of non-democratic practices. 
Dunn résumés that the term has “the air of a shared verbal talisman rather than of a real 
                                                 
11 G. Cappocia u. D. Ziblatt, Ibid., p. 966. 
12 J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy, London: Simon & Schuster 2009. „By putting things into a longer 
historical perspective, and by using different definitions and a more nuanced framework of interpretation, it 
proposes that present-day trends are quite different from, more contradictory and certainly much more interesting 
than has been supposed by far-fetched – and short-sighted – reports of the Freedom House bind.” p. xxv. 
13 J. Dunn, “Democracy and its Discontents: Review ‘The Life and Death of Democracy’”, The National Interest, 
March/April 2010. http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/democracy-its-discontents-3385 (20.08.2010) “Monitory 
democracy […] offers no coherent basis on which to assign entitlement or competence to judge, no way of 
rendering its judges or judgments accountable, and no systematic means to align judgment with the control of 
consequences in the world.” 
14 Ch. Tilly, Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 34. 
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agreement in practical judgement on any concrete topic.”15 The use of the term democracy as a 
melting pot for so many different meanings and nuances can not only be seen in the daily 
conversations of ordinary citizens but also and to a similarly confusing degree in the scientific 
community, contrary to their own self-imposed obligation to maintain a clear definitional line. 
Dunn observes that “at present democracy features in the political speech and understanding of 
the world’s populations in a deeply equivocal way, and spreads profound political confusion 
across the world simply by doing so.”16  
In order to carve a way out of this mold Dunn proposes, as a first step, the need to simply 
understand what democracy signifies: “There is always in practice a great deal to be said 
against democracy. To understand its passage through history and across the world, you need to 
start off by trying to understand what it is. Then you need to learn even more history […] and 
try to puzzle quite what it means.”17 It is rather counterproductive for the understanding of our 
current situation if political analysis starts off with typologizing the political arrangements 
without taking into consideration what it actually is that these typologies are to explain. 
Understanding Democracy 
According to Dunn, the missing differentiation of democracy as an idea and as a state form 
leads to the paradoxical situation that we share a huge confidence in the workings of our 
present-day democratic institutional settings although we do not quite understand what the 
practical implications of the democratic values for the working of these institutions actually are. 
To put it differently: “One important fact about this strange form of life we now share is that 
almost no one within it tries to take in the fate of democracy in both these two key senses 
anywhere at all. But the sharp bifurcation of attention for the vast majority of us between these 
two domains […] prompts us to a preoccupation with the ethical and the desirable from any 
sustained attempt to grasp what is happening in the world and why it is happening […] But it 
makes virtually no demand that these two should meet, and at least confront one another.”18 
The arena where the confrontation of these two components first took place was the antique 
polis of Athens. It is therefore crucial to go back to the Athenian democracy in order to shed 
light on the link between the idea and the form of state. Although this approach is only to be 
found among a few scarce social scientists the importance of this recourse is unquestionable. 
Dunn scrutinizingly states: “Today, at least for the present, things look very different. We may 
well doubt that they really are quite so different.”19 From Athens the democratic voice started 
                                                 
15 J. Dunn (ed.), Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993, 
p. 239. 
16 J. Dunn, “Tracking Democracy”, in: Political Theory, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2010, pp. 106-110, p. 109 
17 J. Dunn, “Democracy: Review Charles Tilly ‚Democracy‘”, in: European Journal of Sociology, No. 49, 2008, 
pp. 487-491, p. 491. 
18 J. Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy, London: Atlantik Books 2005, p. 173. 
19 J. Dunn, Democracy: The Unfinished Journey, p. 240. 
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to echoe through the passages of history and carried the hope “that human life in the settings in 
which it takes place may come to be more a matter of committed personal choice and less a 
matter of enforced compliance with impersonal and external (and unwelcome) demands.”20 As 
a derivative of this hope the following feature of democratization is to be acknowledged: “What 
is distinctive to democratic success is internal, political and cultural, not external, economic or 
military.”21 
If we preponderantly wish the huge void which contemporary generations of democrats feel 
when they put that hope in relation to established modern democratic regimes to have any 
meaning for the understanding of our political way of life we must find a new route to looking 
at what causes us to perceive that void. Only when we begin to think about the interaction of 
ideas and practices will we be able to gain a grasp of the cacophony which surrounds us and 
which conceals, beneath the surface, unwanted relations of dependence and subjection. In this 
regard, the history of political thought offers a key to the overcoming of the cognitive myopia 
and helps us to understand what has happened in the social transformations which we are part 
of. 
4. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
In order to clear the cloud of confusion with regard to the meaning of democracy and the 
political condition of the world in which we live  “we need bolder, clearer, imaginatively more 
searching, and humanely more engaging insight than any now offered by modern social 
sciences or the corrupt practices of professional politicians or bureaucrats.”22 During the 1960s 
this intellectual need brought John Dunn together with Quentin Skinner and John Pocock to 
develop a historiographic approach which soon after became known as the Cambridge 
School. 23  By considerung canonical texts of political thinking, not as abstract theoretical 
systems, but as a testimony of previous political agency great care was given to the guiding 
stipulation that this new approach “takes the historical character of the texts as fundamental and 
understands these, in the last instance, as highly complex human actions.”24 In his article, The 
Identity of the History of Ideas, which was published in 1968, Dunn explains that the goal of his 
method is to demonstrate “that thinking is an effortful activity on the part of human beings, not 
simply a unitary performance […] Once talking and thinking are considered seriously as social 
activities, it will be apparent that intellectual discussions will only be fully understood if they 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 256. 
21 J. Dunn, “How Democracies Succeed”, in: Economy and Society, No 25 1996, pp. 511-528, p. 525. 
22 J. Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, in: J. Dunn (ed.), The History of Political Theory and Other Essays, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1996, pp. 11-38, p. 34. 
23 Cf. E. Hellmuth u. C. v. Ehrenstein, “Intellectual History made in Britain: Die Cambridge School und ihre 
Kritiker“, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, No. 27, 2001, pp. 149-172. 
24 J. Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, p. 19. 
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are seen as complicated instances of these social activities.”25 The works of the history of 
political thinking were not created in a vacuum and therefore it is necessary to ask what reasons 
the author had to put his theory forward.26 The overall advantage of the historiographic method 
is accordingly the “clarification and assessment of political goals and in the appraisal of 
political action.”27 The study of the history of political thinking differs from other areas of 
social science. Its main emphasis is to address the “vagaries of human interest”28. There was no 
doubt that the dedication to an active reflection of the history of political thinking would entail 
a new understanding of the foundation for contemporary politics as well. Dunn notes: “The 
scandal is that our contemporary comprehension of politics, unlike our contemporary 
comprehension of physics or biology or chemistry, should still be so deeply mired in history as 
such: not that the history of political theory should differ appreciably from physics, but that 
political theory itself should still remain such an intractably and intensely historical subject.”29 
Especially in the light of the increasing role of politics in the shaping of modern societies the 
historical method does not only promote a critical perspective but also offers a path to assessing 
future scenarios. Dunn assumes: “Politics has never been so important before in human history. 
But it cannot be said that the human understanding of politics has grown commensurately with 
its devastating importance.”30 
The Historiographical Method 
The contextualising method of the historiographic approach of interpretation consists of the 
analysis of the causalities of paradigmatic change in political discourse. It is assumed that these 
paradigmatic changes take place during periods of revolution. In appreciation of theses phases 
of upheaval the special “cognitive force”31 of a historical text can then be uncovered. Since the 
authors of political texts are seen as social actors who developed their thinking in a context of 
political discourse which nurtured their theory it is possible to study the reciprocal influence of 
the set of conventional political vocabulary and the author’s attempt to change that vocabulary. 
It is the central paradigm in historiographic thinking that language does not only serve to 
expand knowledge but that it is also used to legitimize the prevailing discourse for the 
legitimization of systems of domination or government. Every new political vocabulary has 
                                                 
25 J. Dunn, “The Identity of the History of Ideas”, in: Philosophy, Vol XLIII, No. 164, April 1968, pp. 85-104, p. 
88.  
26 Cf. D. Bell, The Cambridge School and World Politics: Critical Theory, History and Conceptual Change, in: 
First Press, 2001, http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/103bell.htm, (25.08.2010), 
27 J. Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, p. 13. Dunn notes critically: “It has been in these two respects that 
the expectations of its obsolence held by postwar American social scientists and British analytical philosophers 
have proved most obvious astray.“ 
28 Ibid., p. 11. 
29 Ibid., p. 12. 
30 Ibid., p. 12-13. 
31 J. Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, p. 27. 
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therefore an impact on the social reality and understanding thereof. The methodical starting 
point is the presumption that every society has command over a limited and frequently used 
vocabulary, which is derived from a process of conceptionalization within different areas of the 
political arena. Social and political revolutions present a new dynamic to these processes of 
conceptionalization and trigger this paradigmatic change. During these paradigmatic changes 
there appears a disruption between the meaning of the conventional vocabulary to understand 
the political conditions and the political reality itself. As a consequence, the political 
vocabulary does not sufficiently and adequately represent political reality and discontinuities 
become obvious. The analyzing of these ruptures in political language is thus the major goal of 
the Cambridge School. It is also acknowledged that during times of political continuity the 
language of political authors and his or her possibility to cognize the political developments are 
restricted to the existing vocabulary. To sum up, language functions as a connecting means 
between political praxis and political thinking. The close and careful study of language is 
therefore of utmost importance. Difficulties arise from hasty conclusions, as Bell notes: 
“knowledge of the social context in which an author wrote a work is not the same as 
understanding the meaning of the work, for it cannot account for the intention of the author.”32 
The broader theoretical underpinning for the historiographic analysis is based on the definition 
of the political as “a space of human action, always conducted under very severe constraints 
and on the basis of restricted information, by creatures of limited skill and practical wisdom.”33 
Dunn points out that the limitation of political agency has to be carefully considered in these 
forms of study, which will help us to understand the intricacy of the subject matter of social 
science. He notes: “It is the constitutive role of human agency in politics as a subject matter 
which renders it so radically exposed to the vicissitudes of human beliefs and of the ideas 
which organize and articulate those beliefs.”34 
5. SETTING THE PEOPLE FREE – THE PATH OF DEMOCRACY 
Departing from the historiographic method as a means to understanding politics, Dunn begins 
his study of democracy with two distinctively important questions. The first one is: “Why 
should it be the case, for example, that an ancient Greek noun, which did not even linguistically 
imply merit, or dependibility, or even good intentions, within rule, and which for most of its 
history as a word signified a peculiarly discredited and unfeasible form of rule […], has 
become so recently the anodyne label for legitimate political authority across most of our 
polyglot globe?” The second one resounds: “Why should the regime form with which that term 
is now somewhat speciously associated, the modern representative republic, founded on 
popular sovereignty expressed through universal adult suffrage […] quite suddenly have won 
                                                 
32 D. Bell, The Cambridge School and World Politics, p. 7. 
33 J. Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, p. 13. 
34 J. Dunn, “The History of Political Theory”, p. 13. 
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the global struggle for wealth and power so handsomely and with such apparent 
decisiveness?”35 The development of democracy has to be seen in the tension between what 
was understood at certain times by the term democracy, its ideological contents and the 
political institutions which were influenced by the language. 
In Athens democracy was the name for a clearly distinguishable form of political regime which 
took equality to be at the centre of political activity. Dunn notes, concerning this feature of 
democracy in ancient Greece, “democracies were states which took the political component of 
citizen equality rather seriously”.36 In contrast, modern states are limited to only symbolically 
appreciating the goal of equality: “Modern state structures concentrate power to a degree which 
no ancient state could have begun to emulate and to a degree that fifth and fourth century BC 
Athenians, for example, would have considered a complete negation of democracy.”37  
The glance back to the Athenian democracy is not in its appreciation “as a haven to which it 
would be seemly or reasonable to yearn to return [...], but as a series of structures through 
which to think about politics by a controlled contrast with the circumstances of today.”38 With 
this line of thought Dunn follows Moses Finley. Finley considers the study of Athenian 
democracy to uncover important conceptual features for the understanding of the modern form 
of government und political life. In Democracy Ancient and Modern he therefore concludes: 
“We must consider not only why the classical theory of democracy appears to be in 
contradiction with the observed practice, but also why the many different responses to this 
observation, though mutually incompatible, all share the belief that democracy is the best form 
of political organization.”39 
Dunn follows this interpretation and outlines the historical steps of the development of 
democracy from Athens until today in his book Setting the People Free. The book encourages a 
critical reflection of current and very familiar political terminology, which most of its readers 
are doubtlessly fond of. It is uncompromisingly clear about its refusal to offer a positive 
outlook on our democratic self-conception. Cannon pointedly remarks that it is a “sobering 
book at a sobering time”40. This is especially so as Dunn demonstrates that democracy is no 
longer defined as the participation of the citizens in ruling, and not even in the processes of 
deliberation in accordance with the attic idea of isegoria, but as a system in which citizens are 
                                                 
35 J. Dunn, “The Aftermath of Communism and the Vicissitudes of Public Trust”, in: Proceedings of the British 
Academy, No. 123, 2004, pp. 195-209, p. 203. 
36 J. Dunn, “Democratic Theory”, J. Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1993, p. 13. 
37 Ibid., p. 13. 
38 J. Dunn, “Tracking Democracy”, p. 108. 
39 M. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern, London: Chatto and Windus 1973, p. 10-11. 
40 J. Cannon, “Review, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy”, English Historical Review, CXXII 
(497), 2007, pp. 804-805, p. 805. 
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not only far from ruling themselves but even more adjusted to the continuing demands to keep 
the order of egoism in a functioning condition.41 Why has that change happened? And what are 
the consequences of that change for our understanding of politics today? 
The Phases of Democracy 
Dunn subdivides the development of this meaning into three major phases.42 The first phase 
began in ancient Greece and reaches up to the Middle Ages. It is characteristic for this period of 
intellectual tradition that the term democracy was given a negative connotation, which referred 
back to the political theory of Aristotle. The use of the term in the texts of the middle age is for 
the most part hesitant. The change to this use happened for the first time in the 17th century: 
“Perhaps by the time of English Civil War, and certainly by the time that it became available 
for recollection in anything but tranquility, the potential of this pejorative analytical term to 
pick out potent sources of allegiance was at last in clear view. From then on, its rise to world 
mastery, at least at a verbal level, was just to be a matter of time.”43  
The second phase takes shape in the 18th century when a number of authors paid more and 
more attention to the word and attached certain ideas to it relating to how the revolutions on the 
American as well as European continent were to be understood. It was during these times that 
revolutionary values where incorporated into and described by the term. Dunn notes: “Anyone 
who chose to do so placed themselves far beyond the borders of political life, at the outer 
fringes of the intellectual lives of virtually all their contemporaries.”44 In the United States of 
America the term began to dominate the political discourse and consequently shaped the social 
development fundamentally: “It faced no surviving rivals and was seldom under much pressure 
to reflect on its own nature, let alone defend itself against a real challenge to its ascendancy.”45 
Henceforth, any publicly presented partisanship against the acknowledged set of meanings of 
the term equated to nothing short of the position of a maverick. The situation on the European 
continent was rather different. In Europe the term democracy had different meanings, including 
a highly provocative and powerful one introduced by Robespierre, “It was Robespierre above 
all who brought democracy back to life as a focus of political allegiance: no longer merely an 
                                                 
41 Cf. J. Dunn, Setting the People Free, p. 160. 
42 The phases are to be interpreted as elements of a “single historical sequence: one which has a clear beginning, 
and which, for all its proliferating subsequent variety, ought in principle to be intelligible as a historically natural 
outcome, across time and space, of that singularly concrete and distinctive commencement.” J. Dunn, “Democracy: 
The Politics of Making, defending and exemplifying community: Europe 1992”, J. Dunn: The History of Political 
Theory, p. 178. 
43 J. Dunn, Setting the People Free, p. 60. 
44 Ibid., p. 71. 
45 Ibid., p. 84. 
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elusive or blatantly implausible form of government, but a glowing and perhaps in the long run 
all but irresistible pole of attraction and source of power.”46  
During the phase that followed these revolutionary periods the two most influential meanings 
began to emerge, namely as the order of egoism and the order of equality: “One reason why 
democracy remained such a fiercely divisive political category in Europe for the next fifty 
years was that Buonarroti’s conception of what it meant continued to strike a deeper chord than 
the different view worked out in practice at the same time in the United States. In America, 
once the Constitution was firmly in place, democracy soon became the undisputed political 
framework and expression of the order of egoism.”47 Dunn argues that during that phase the 
word democracy was attached to a meaning of a form of government as well as that of a 
political value. The attribution of very different meanings developed into a battleground for 
ideological rivalries between partisans of the order of egoism and those of the order of equality, 
lasting well into the 20th century. During the same period, the term’s connotations relating to 
very distinct forms of government emerged: “Democracy has altered its meaning so sharply 
since Babeuf because it has passed definitively from the hands of the Equals to those of the 
political leaders of the order of egoism. These leaders apply it (with the active consent of most 
of us) to the form of government which selects them and enables them to rule.”48 On the side of 
the proponents of equality democracy defined a set of governmental institutions which were 
responsible for achieving the goal of equality. In the course of history it was the form of regime 
of the order of egoism which eventually obtained a more dominant force in that battle: 
“American statecraft became, very slowly, a little more fastidious; wealthier and better-
educated populations in many different countries took sharper exception to authoritarian rule 
[…] or the economic cycle turned sharply against it. Under this American provenance 
democracy was presented and welcomed as a well-established recipe both for nurturing the 
order of egoism and combining its flourishing with some real protection for the civil rights of 
most of the population.”49 The self-given image of the western regime form, and with it the 
meaning of the term, transmuted once again when democracy was used as a justification for 
warlike invasions in the fight against terrorism.  
A Tug of War 
By means of the demonstration of these phases Dunn succeeds in narrowing down the 
paradoxes in our current understanding of the term. He concludes: “The key to the form of life 
as a whole is thus an endless tug of war between two instructive bet very different senses of 
democracy. In that struggle, the second sense, democracy as a political value, constantly 
subverts the legitimacy of democracy as an already existing form of government. But the first, 
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too, almost as constantly on its own behalf, explores, but then insists on and in the end imposes, 
its own priority over the second.”50 
Dunn‘s historiographic analysis is valuable in one important aspect: We learn to step out of our 
democratic comfort zone and are drawn to assuming and to a great extent engaging in an 
outlook towards our future that the idea of democracy is far from becoming a stable, 
universally shared and commonly understood idea, and is far from providing us a secure means 
to handling an uncertainty that we are inevitably facing in future. Similarly, the democratic 
institutional settings of the modern republic give little hope that things will remain as smooth 
and sustained as we are made to believe by political representatives. Moreover, Dunn’s analysis 
offers a clear historical timeframe within which our current system of government is founded: 
“the period of time over which it makes sense to think of democracy as setting about its global 
conquest reaches back no further than America’s founding”. 51 
Finally, Dunn has demonstrated that democracy is derived from nothing other than political 
choices. In the course of history it grew triumphant only due to the political actors and their 
situational decisions to bring about or to limit changes: “that one vast overarching choice has 
been composed in turn of myriads and myriads of other choices […] each in the end made by a 
single partially self-aware living human actor.” 52  It is therefore methodically crucial to 
investigate the contexts of these decisions, their justification and description as well as the 
external circumstances and forces which lead to the decisions to organise society the way it was 
done. “To grasp those contexts and recognize those pressures will to some degree safeguard us 
against the temptation to romanticize our sense of what has been in play, or draw it too 
ingeniously from our parochial horizon of experience.”53 
6. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PROCESSES OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
In Dunn’s point of view democratization is closely connected to the political value of 
democracy and is – in contrast to the determined forms of government – to be regarded as: 
“open-ended, indeterminate and exploratory.” He continues: “It sets out from, and responds to, 
the conception of democracy as a political value, a way in which whatever matters deeply for a 
body of human beings should in the end be decided.” Hence, the decision is based on 
circumstantial and intellectual incidences, which lead towards the choice for a democratic 
system. In order to grasp the intellectual dimension of the social, cultural, economic and 
political processes it is important to draw careful attention to the local perceptions of these 
changes und the associated wishes and hopes of the population. With regard to the 
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developments in Russia John Dunn emphasizes that we must bear in mind: “It is more 
rewarding to consider it not objectively and at an analytical prudent distance (as a frozen mass 
of externally detectable and specifiable behaviour), but in more immediate relation to the 
political perceptions, judgements, and sentiments of its denizens.” 54  The central aim is to 
interpret the reasons for political agency and how these reasons serve as an evaluation and 
judgment of political change. Consequently, he states: “from the viewpoint of past, present, and 
prospective political choice and its more or less articulated grounds and rationales, dispersed, as 
democracy requires us to see these, across its huge and often understandably bemused 
population.”55 In this way we would also succeed in finding a balanced understanding of the 
role of the demos in that process of democratization and provide an alternative view to what 
has nowadays became so widely neglected. That is to say, that the instructed changes of the 
latest waves of transformation were legitimized to achieve “political normality”. But it remains 
open as to what that “political normality” is actually supposed to mean. Obviously it was 
connected with a process of fashioning the demos towards normality without taking into 
account that it is the normality that actually needs to be thoroughly and deeply imagined as 
something closely linked to the demos itself and its way of living. Therefore an analysis has to 
start off with the people who are simply living in our human society and not with the idea or the 
people that should be there. The moral aim which can usually be detected in the theories of 
democracy and in the theories of democratization has to be reconsidered and challenged in the 
face of historical complexity. With Dunn’s theoretical approach we are offered a view that is 
not solely informed by theoretical, universal and analytical textures but rather by a critical 
contextual understanding. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The triumph of democracy has been widely discussed in the literature on democratization, 
especially after the revolutions of 1989. Recently, the initial euphoria, which was closely 
connected with scientific attempts to project the path of democratic institutionalization and 
cultural transformation towards commonly shared democratic values, turned into a somber 
view on the consistency of the success of the implementation of democratic regimes, as well as 
the scientific probability of any sort of prediction. Based on this change, a highly 
contemporaneous debate has begun on the necessity of returning to a more historical 
perspective on the conflicts that explain and explicate the emergence of democracy. Although 
this approach promises to shed more light on the longer term effects of introducing democratic 
institutions and their interconnection with social and political cleavages it focuses too narrowly 
on democratization as the implementation of institutions. In contrast to this the political-
historical approach of John Dunn offers a methodological approach that allows for a critical 
view on the reasons for political choices and the relevance of democracy as an idea that shapes 
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political praxis and political institutions that label themselves democratic. By his distinction of 
democracy as a word, as an idea and as a form of state Dunn highlights the need to gain a view 
on democratization as political agency in tight relation to the theoretical debates surrounding 
them, rather than as a solely systematic scheme.   
Bourke and Geuss describe Dunn’s attempt in a twofold manner: “The first is his attempt to 
rehabilitate the standpoint and the cognitive and practical skill of the political actor, and this 
means recognizing the importance of understanding the judgment of real political actors – 
where ‘judgement’ most definitely does not mean simply the subsumption of individual cases 
under pre-given concepts.” They then continue: “Dunn’s second and related innovation is his 
emphasis on the historical variability and context-specifity of political concepts, once again in 
opposition to the tacit Socratic and Platonic assumption that key political terms […] designate 
in each case something that is definably the same hic et ubique.”56 
As such the democratic theory of John Dunn offers an analyse of the traces that the term 
democracy has left in world history, which can help to nourish current theoretical debates and 
improve scientific approaches to studying the success or failure of democratic regimes. An 
approach on the basis of his methodology would necessarily include a focus on the 
understanding of the hope and beliefs held in the population regarding the choices taken in the 
political process and a better understanding of the relevance of the effect of political ideas on 
political causalities. It would also dwell on the implications of local contexts on the forming of 
or the adapting to political concepts in the “single causal field of politics: not as a reality 
outside and above politics, to which the latter is conclusively answerable.”57 
The question why democracy has triumphed is therefore closely linked to why it could become 
a reasonable political choice and to which extent the forms of regime and the logic of political 
praxis succeed in reproducing the expectations which are trustfully identified with their 
legitimacy. It would apply imaginative force to trace back “what it makes sense to do 
politically, within, and in relation to, a modern republic.”58 
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